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Abstract
By drawing on feminist epistemology, ethics
and pedagogy this paper articulates some
aspects of a care-based ethics of teaching.
Understanding teaching as a species of
caring, it explores some consequences for
teaching practice of the attentiveness,
re s p o n s iv e n e s s ,  a n d  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y
characteristic of caring professionals. 
Résumé 
En tirant de l’épistémologie féministe de
l’éthique et de la pédagogie, cet article
exprime clairement certains aspects de
l’enseignement de l’éthique basée sur les
soins. En comprenant que l’enseignement est
une espèce de soin, il explore certaines des
c o n s é q ue n c e s  d e  la  p r a t iq u e  d e
l’enseignement du soin apporté au travail, de
la réceptivité et de la responsabilité
caractéristique des profesionnels qui ont de la
compassion. 
From Care Ethics to an Ethics of
Teaching
For nearly twenty years I have been a
teacher of philosophy in a liberal arts college
for women. Ours is not an elite institution, but
one whose mission is to educate women who
might not otherwise consider a college
education - women of color, first and second
generation immigrant women, women from
working class and poor families. W e have our
share of high school valedictorians, but we
also have many students burdened by
deficient educational backgrounds. W hatever
their learning needs, my colleagues and I try
to hold our students to high expectations, and
to provide the support they require to achieve
them. Many influences have shaped my
choices about how to relate to these students
and how to teach them; one of the most
important is my reading of feminist
philosophy. 
I believe that a feminist ethics of care
provides the best foundation for an ethics of
teaching, and in this article I want to explain
how feminist ethics and epistemology,
feminist pedagogy, and my practice with my
students have informed my view of what and
how I ought to teach. In thinking about the
domains of teacher responsibility, I will draw
on the work of Joan Tronto on professional
responsibility, and in considering the
implications this has for pedagogy, I will turn
to the work of Goldberger et al. in their 1996
volume, Knowledge, Difference and Power:
Essays Inspired by Women's Ways of
Knowing.
Given some well-founded suspicion of
a feminist ethics of care, it is with some
trepidation that I propose an ethics of
teaching situated within that tradition.
Varieties of an ethics of care were developed
by a number of feminist philosophers, among
them Nel Noddings, Sara Ruddick, and Joan
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Tronto; and some of the sharpest criticisms of
this approach have come from feminists
themselves (Cole and Coultrap-Quinn 1992;
Gilligan 1972;  Kittay and Meyers 1987;
Noddings 1984; Ruddick 1989; Tronto 1993).
In most general terms, an ethics of care
focuses on care as a central moral category,
and suggests that a coherent focus of an
ethical theory can be attention to how we
might best care for one another in concrete
situations. Feminist critiques of ethics of care
objected to the essentialist claims in early
formulations about the moral reasoning of all
women, to what seemed like the valorization
of specifically feminine virtues, and to the
somewhat simplistic opposition between the
ethics of care and the ethics of justice. As a
result of two decades of critiques of care
ethics, some refinements of this approach
have been articulated, so that in proposing an
ethics of care for teaching, I can say what I do
not mean: such an ethics of care would not
require accepting the existence of or
advocating the adoption of "feminine virtues";
it would not rest on universal claims about
how all women think or reason morally; it
would not take mothering, especially
mothering in patriarchal cultures, as the
paradigm of ethical behavior (in such a way
that good mothering is tied to either servility or
supererogation); and it does not propose an
ethics of care as exclusive of and superior to
other ethical approaches, such as an ethic of
justice. W hat care ethics does offer, as does
its "cousin," virtue ethics, is the emphasis on
the ethical requirements that arise out of
practices in particular circumstances or
domains. 
Some early writers in the care
tradition suggested that an ethics of care
ought to be restricted to the private sphere,
leaving the sphere of politics and public life to
be governed by justice, with its emphasis on
duty, obligation and rights. Instead, following
Joan Tronto, I suggest that the four
components of caring - caring about, caring
for, care giving and care receiving - can help
to illum ina te the  responsibilities of
professionals (Tronto 2001). 
Tronto defines caring about as being
attentive to others' need for care, caring for as
taking on the responsibility of responding to
that need, care giving as the response itself,
and receiving care as openness in one's need
to the assistance of others. Tronto's account
is helpful because she reminds us that care
giving is more than an intuitive and untrained
response; it requires competence and
reflective practice. At the same time,
professional competence is incomplete
without the attentiveness, responsiveness,
and responsibility called for in a caring
relationship. 
In an article entitled "Does Managing
Professionals Affect Professional Ethics?"
(2001) Tronto wrote about the increasing
tendency for managers to "survey and control"
the activities of professionals, in ways that
appear to compromise the professionals'
autonomy. W hile Tronto does not have much
to say about college and university faculty in
this article, complaints by faculty about the
growing intrusion of administrators into how
and what they teach are increasingly heard in
academic circles. Tronto acknowledges that
professionals have based their claims to
autonomy on their professional expertise and
competence, but she says these claims
sometimes take the exaggerated form of
insistence on immunity from scrutiny by the
institutions and publics they serve. Tronto
calls for a reconsideration of the
responsibilities of professionals by adding the
requirement of caring to the possession of
expert knowledge and the provision of
competent service. Echoing Tronto, in what
follows, I will explore what adding caring to
competence in the act of teaching might look
like. 
Framework for an Ethics of Teaching:
Attentiveness, Responsiveness,
Responsibility
I f  a s  c o m p e te n t  te a c h in g
professionals we are called to take up the
responsibility for being attentive and
responsive to our students, and our students
were women, would we teach in different
ways to meet their needs, as many in the
Atlantis 33.2, 2009  www.msvu.ca/atlantis 64
tradition of fem inist pedagogy have
suggested? In 1986, in Women's Ways of
Knowing, Belenky et al. argued that traditional
courses in higher education were not
designed with female students and their
learning in mind, but foregrounded the
teacher's knowledge, and focused on
questions and issues central to academic and
professional disciplines. But questions that
women students may have, because they
arise out of women's experience, may not
intersect with the questions in the mainstream
of the discipline as the teacher presents it
(Belenky et al. 1986). Effective learning
experiences for women would build on what
women know and how they acquire
knowledge. Effective and caring teaching
would thus not be focused on the teacher and
what she knows, but centered on the student
and her learning. 
In a collection of essays reflecting on
the impact of Women's Ways of Knowing ten
years after its original publication, feminist
scholars argued that the revolution in
pedagogy and curriculum design called for in
that work has remained incomplete. Several
of the authors raised concerns about the idea
that women know and learn differently that
are similar to concerns that have been
expressed about the ethics of care. Claims
about a distinctive way of knowing for women,
if not framed carefully, may appear
essentialist, create a new feminine ghetto for
women, and fail to do justice to the variety of
women's experiences (Goldberger et al.
1996). In response to these concerns, Sara
Ruddick suggests that Women's Ways of
Knowing is itself part of a collective project of
fem inist epistemology, the project of
articulating "connected knowing," a way of
knowing that arises out of particular social
circumstances most often occupied by
women in our culture (Ruddick 1996, 255).
Connected knowing is opposed by Ruddick to
impersonal procedural knowing, which treats
the knower and her circumstances as
irrelevant to how she goes about acquiring
knowledge and to claims she makes about
what she knows. If we assume with the
project of "connected knowing" that where we
stand makes a difference to what we know,
then it is not irrelevant to women's knowing
that women in our society still do the majority
of domestic labor and have the dominant
responsibility for child-rearing and the care of
the dependent, and that many occupations
and professional fields are still gendered, in
that their practitioners are more likely to be
one gender than another. Because of
women's social position, women's knowledge
is often characterized by attention to particular
relationships, objects and persons; it avoids
the separation of the emotions and bodily
experience from knowledge; and it includes
the capacity to appreciate as well as to
criticize (Ruddick 1996). Recognizing that this
is the kind of knowing that women may bring
to the classroom, what does being attentive to
and responding to women's learning needs
require? 
Frame Within the Frame: Attentiveness
and Responsiveness in Teaching
Practice
Over the last several decades, an
attentive and responsive feminist teaching
practice has developed based upon
assumptions about these processes of
women's identity formation and knowing. As
part of an ethnographic study of feminist
teachers in women's studies programs and
elsewhere in higher education, Frances A.
Maher and Mary Kay Tetreault identified four
themes in feminists' reflection on their
teaching - mastery, voice, authority and
positionality (Maher and Tetreault 1996).
Positionality refers, as has been said here, to
giving consideration when designing learning
to how students' identities are shaped by their
social locations and the relationships in which
they find themselves. Mastery is concerned
with re-examining what the students are
supposed to learn, both in terms of
disciplinary content and of how that content
relates to where students are com ing from
and what they aspire to become. Voice refers
both to strategies for empowering student
expression and to constructing a community
of expression in which student voices can be
developed. Authority in feminist classrooms is
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treated as something to be negotiated
between students and teacher, rather than
vested solely in the teacher by virtue of her
own disciplinary mastery and institutional
power. 
Each of these dimensions of feminist
pedagogy has been vital to my own practice
as a teacher. I will explain how in being
attentive and responsive to our students we
need to take into account positionality,
mastery, voice and authority in teaching and
learning. 
Taking Positionality into Account in
Practice
Positionality is a special concern for
me as a teacher, given who my students are
- over half of my students are the first in their
families to attend college, and 40% are
women of color. Being attentive to the social
location of these students means recognizing
that, because many are members of groups
that have historically been underrepresented
in or absent from higher education, they may
have feelings of estrangement or alienation,
may be uncertain about what succeeding in
higher education will ask of them, or may lack
confidence in their ability to do intellectual
work. Being attentive also means being aware
of my own epistemological authority, and of
the social status that advanced degrees and
a career in higher education confer. W hile in
previous decades, students were more likely
to defer to teaching faculty, the response of
students to my position may range from
deference to dismissal, and these attitudes
may have more to do with what I represent
than who I am. Miriam Kalman Harris, an
associate professor of English, in an article in
the Chronicle of Higher Education entitled
"W e are Smarter than Our Students,"
expresses frustration with her students' lack
of respect for her disciplinary expertise. In
response to a student's accusation that she is
an intellectual snob, she asks herself, "W ho
do they think we are? W hat kind of professor,
with or without a PhD, isn't 'smarter' than his
or her students? And if we aren't smarter,
then what in heaven's name are we doing
teaching?" (Harris 2002). Harris attributes the
failure of today's students to learn to respect
others, to follow proper procedures, and to
communicate effectively to their lack of
respect for the epistemic authority of their
professors. 
But, as Lorraine Code pointed out
when examining epistemic authority in What
Can She Know , knowers and knowledge
claims do not operate in a vacuum. Our
claims to knowledge and expertise are not
just statements about our personal history,
but depend for their justification on a complex
web of claims about the legitimacy of the
institutions that shaped us and the social
standing conferred on us by our education
(Code 1991). Our students recognize that
they have to "get past us" to win their own
degrees; we occupy the social status they
seek. W hile in the earlier, better times that
Harris longs for, students willingly paid the
price of deference in order to study with
master teachers, students today are more
cynical about authority (as, frankly, we all are)
and may feel that our position is not earned
but arbitrary, the result of race or class
privilege, or just plain luck. If our relationship
with our students is one of estrangement, our
response must not be a bald reassertion of
our authority, but an acknowledgment of its
foundations and its lim its. For instance, I
acknowledge and explain to my students the
difficulties of intellectual work for women,
especially working class and poor women and
women of color. I share my own successes
and struggles as a woman who is trying to live
an academic and intellectual life. My students
may need assistance and encouragement to
enter into academic culture; that culture may
pose some serious risks for them, in terms of
threatening their established identities and
relationships (Lugones 1989). These risks - of
changing identity, of straining ties with home
and community - are very real not just for
students from marginalized groups, but for
any of my women students. If there exists a
gulf of alienation between ourselves and our
students, it is not likely to be closed by a
remote posture, but by sharing something of
our humanity and our own circumstances with
them. 
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Fostering Disciplinary Mastery in
Practice
The authors of Women's Ways of
Knowing suggested that a curriculum that
helps students to achieve disciplinary mastery
needs to be designed with the needs of the
students, not the teacher, in mind (Belenky et
al. 1986). So being attentive to students
requires a curricular response, rethinking the
relationship between our students' lives and
what they study with us. In our small liberal
arts college, there are never more than twenty
students who have declared a major in
philosophy, and of these, only a handful
consider graduate study in philosophy. My
philosophy colleagues and I earned
doctorates in philosophy programs that
emphasized broad coverage of the history or
problems of philosophy. W e have the
expertise to model our curriculum after our
own graduate studies, but we have made a
collective decision to change our focus. W e
have asked ourselves, what use are our
students likely to make of their studies in
philosophy? How can their philosophy studies
contribute to a full and satisfying life in
whatever careers they pursue? Our aim then
is not to survey the history or problems of
philosophy, but to teach the discipline of
philosophy as a way of learning, as a
disciplinary practice, rather than as a body of
knowledge. (I have written in greater detail
about this approach in "Teaching Students to
Practice Philosophy" in a volume of essays
written by my Alverno colleagues, Disciplines
as Frameworks for Student Learning
[Engelmann 2005]). Teaching texts and
issues in philosophy becomes a vehicle for
student learning about the uses and benefits
of doing philosophy, and an occasion for
practicing the discipline. This also means that
the curriculum has to change with changes in
the student body - the demographics of the
students, their career goals and life
experiences.
W e believe that doing philosophy has
enhanced our own critical thinking, our
response to the social and political issues of
the day, and our engagement with the arts
and culture, and so we want our students to
actively engage in the practice of the
discipline, rather than looking on while we and
others philosophize. But being attentive to our
students also means that we must recognize
that the practices of philosophy and the
culture of the discipline have arisen within a
particular historical and social context, and
that these practices may be foreign to our
students' experiences. For instance, bell
hooks has written about the way in which
academic philosophy privileges writing and
speaking that is more abstract and full of
jargon, and scorns philosophizing that is more
widely accessible (hooks 1994). Although it
has set itself the goal of exploring the
concerns of everyday life, this hierarchy exists
within feminist philosophy as well. My
students, whatever their home communities
and styles of communication, often find
philosophical discourse and problems foreign
and unhelpful in addressing the issues in their
lives. Faced with this gap, I try to close it by
selecting those texts and issues closest to
students' experience, by helping students
translate philosophical discourse into their
own terms, and by explaining connections
between philosophy and their own learning
goals. In addition, philosophy may seem like
an especially inaccessible culture for my
students because they are women and many
are women of color, for they may not see
themselves and their communities reflected in
the practitioners of mainstream philosophy.
So, in designing learning experiences, I make
a special attempt to work with texts produced
by women and women of color. 
Encouraging Voice in Practice
As a teacher of philosophy, I know
that the practice of my discipline has
historically been dominated by a model that
views the pursuit of truth as an intellectual
contest (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Moulton
1983). Ideas are brought into a public forum
to be critiqued and thereby strengthened, and
philosophers write and speak in response to
the objections they anticipate from others. But
I must consider whether my students' ideas
are ready to be publicly challenged, and
whether it is my task to prepare them to meet
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this challenge. Does the prospect of the
critique of their ideas affect students
differently depending on the degree of their
sense of entitlement to academic citizenship,
so that some are doubly silenced, both by the
competitive culture of higher education, and
by a disciplinary culture of contest? Do some
students have an advantage in the contest
because of background and prior education,
and are they unaware of these privileges?
Being attentive to my students' relationship
with my discipline's ways of producing
knowledge entails a responsibility to make
this mode of knowledge production itself a
subject for study, as well as to explore
alternatives to this model of philosophizing.
Feminist pedagogy has been
sensitive to the issue of developing the voices
of students, recognizing that being historically
relegated to subordinate positions has
silenced women and people of color. Being
attentive to students means creating an
environment in which women's voices are
heard and accorded respect, creating
communities of discourse in which knowledge
is produced through dialogue as well as
through debate. So, I need to determine the
differences in individual students' styles of
communication, and the differences between
their styles and my own, and offer a variety of
learning experiences that give students
opportunities to share their views and develop
them in discussion with their peers and
myself. I also understand that the historical
emphasis on feminine receptivity over agency
has not necessarily made women better
listeners, and I treat students' development of
active listening skills as a necessary
component of their ability to dialogue.
Practical strategies for encouraging students
to voice their views include having students
think and write in response to questions
before they are asked to respond publicly, and
providing opportunities for small group
dialogue for students who feel more
comfortable in face to face interactions than
they do in addressing large groups.
Ultimately, however, my goal is for all my
students to develop facility in expressing their
views in a public forum; as a political
philosopher, I see my philosophy courses as
a setting for fostering the development of
students' citizenship skills. 
Being attentive to my students' need
to find their voices also means that I have an
obligation to be vigilant about the way my own
biases and opinions may subtly - or not so
subtly - rob students of their voices. For
example, as a middle class woman, I have
been socialized to value hard work,
persistence, a concern for appearances, and
a certain kind of intellectual and physical
tidiness, not to mention deference to one's
betters and a willingness to take their
direction. To what extent is the possession of
these values and habits really necessary to
academic and career success, and how does
the presence or absence of these in my
students affect how I respond to them? 
I believe that attentiveness to
students and encouraging the development of
their voices allows for a range of acceptable
practices in regard to advocacy of a teacher's
views in the classroom. If the teacher is
honest with herself and her students about
what constitutes advocacy, and if she does
not penalize or silence those who disagree,
she should be free to teach out of her own
ideological perspective, understanding that
the university is the scene of the free
exchange of ideas, and that in a setting of
liberal education, students are exposed to a
variety of viewpoints. However, as a teacher
of philosophy, I believe that the practice of the
discipline commits me to present a multiplicity
of views, trying to present the views of all in
the best possible light, and assisting my
students to formulate their own views. For
many students, leading with my own
philosophical views m ight stif le their
developing voices. Of course, I have my own
passionate opinions about social and political
issues, and evenhandedness is difficult to
achieve. Self-awareness requires me to be
honest with students when my passion about
issues makes it difficult to present views fairly.
But my goal is to provide a safe environment
in which to dialogue with one another, and to
disagree. 
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Reconfiguring Authority in Practice
In keeping with feminist pedagogical
theory and practice, I have painted a picture
of a classroom that is governed by democratic
ideals in regard to access and discourse. As
an attentive teacher, I am responsible to
create a hospitable learning environment,
welcoming students to the study and practice
of philosophy and to my classroom. I have
emphasized already the need to acknowledge
the sources, scope and limits of my power as
the teacher. Meeting students as whole
human beings also requires that I share my
own humanity; I do this through the use of
personal examples from my own life, by
talking with students informally as much as
possible inside and outside the classroom, by
getting to know students individually, by trying
to listen carefully to each person, and by
bringing humor into our conversations.
Focusing in curriculum design on
student learning needs and creating a
hospitable environment in which each student
feels valued both help to establish a more
democratic learning situation. Through
collaboration with colleagues in my institution,
I have discovered the power of another
strategy that democratizes education by
sharing authority and responsibility for
learning with the students, rather than
reserving it to the teacher. This strategy is the
creation of explicit learning outcomes and
assessing student learning in light of these
outcomes. Alverno College has had a
curriculum based on students' demonstration
of learning outcomes for over thirty years, and
we have produced a body of research which
attests to the effectiveness of this approach
(Mentkowski et al. 2000). In my courses,
making the outcomes for learning public in
advance, and basing the outcomes on what is
required to practice philosophy effectively,
makes it possible for more students to
succeed, and makes evaluation of student
performance less about what I prefer as an
individual instructor, and more about what
learning in philosophy requires. In fact, when
my colleagues in philosophy and I take turns
teaching the same course, for instance, an
introduction to philosophy course, we agree to
use the same learning outcomes for our
students, but each of us chooses our own
learning materials - books, essays, and films.
W e are able to share expectations for what
students will learn, and for the quality of their
performance, because as a department we
have collaborated to create the learning
outcomes for the philosophy major and the
courses within it. Each of us also asks
students to assess their own learning, and to
engage their peers in assessing one another's
learning, which encourages the students to
take greater ownership of their educational
goals and activities. Our evaluation of their
learning as teachers, while based on
disciplinary expertise, and ultimately having
more weight, nevertheless becomes one
evaluation among many, not the least of
which is the student's perspective on her own
progress. In my courses at the advanced
level, I ask students to create their own
learning goals, which either tailor the existing
learning outcomes to their needs, or represent
the unique integration of each student's
learning. This decentering (not abdication) of
the teacher's authority for evaluation
complements a curriculum and a learning
environment that are student-centered, or
more accurately, student learning-centered. 
Taking Collaborative Responsibility for
Learning
As Leslie Pickering Francis has
pointed out in her artic le, "Sexual
Harassment: Developments in Philosophy
and Law," "Academics tend not to think of
themselves as having defined professional
obligations. There is, for example, no
enforceable code of professional ethics for
faculty members beyond that enforced by
contract in their institutions or other
obligations of state or federal law" (Francis
2002). My own attempt to define some
professional obligations for teachers in higher
education - to offer an ethics of teaching -
builds on Joan Tronto's suggestion that we
apply an ethics of care in analyzing the ethics
of professionals. As Tronto has noted,
professionals claim their expertise is best
exercised under conditions which maximize
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individual autonomy, in the usual sense of the
term, and minimize the interference of
managers and governing bodies. But she
reminds us that professionals invariably
depend on other professionals to accomplish
their tasks, and that the relationship between
clients and professionals is almost never a
dyadic one. From this she concludes that
professional competence is not an attribute of
individuals, but of teams (Tronto 2001).
Professionals rely on one another for
certification of their competence, and the
exercise of their competence always occurs in
institutional settings where collaboration is
required to achieve the institutional mission. 
If as teaching faculty we were to
adopt this view of the competence required to
care appropriately for our students, we would
be responsible to take steps to overcome the
relative isolation that has been the hallmark of
college and university teaching. Lorie Roth
describes this isolation very succinctly in an
article published in the AAHE Bulletin entitled
"Sex, Drugs, Rock and Roll and the American
Professor: W hat American Novels Tell Us
About Teaching." 
The novels themselves [Jane
Smiley's Moo, Michael Chabon's
Wonder Boys and Richard Russo's
Straight Man] give us an answer.
Teaching is the most private and
solitary act in academic life, and
teaching is almost always done
behind closed doors. In these novels
even the sex is more public than the
teaching…teaching is always private,
unseen, invisible, imperceptible to the
general academic community. 
(Roth 2002)
One factor in keeping teaching private
is interpreting academic freedom as providing
protection not only for what a faculty member
may say, but also for how he or she may say
it in the classroom. Based on this
interpretation, faculty are often heard to raise
the rallying cry, "No one can tell me how to
teach in my own classroom ." This
interpretation of the protections of academic
freedom falsely portrays professors as
independent contractors of learning, and the
university as the general contractor. In this
metaphor, faculty just show up to put in the
plumbing. I believe that Joan Tronto and Lorie
Roth would agree that this reduces teacher
competence to disciplinary expertise and
works against shared responsibility for the
learning of students. Collaborating, even
across disciplinary boundaries, to design
curricula and learning experiences and to
improve teaching is part of our responsibility
as teaching professionals. 
Taking Responsibility for the
Circumstances of Learning
If, in order to exercise the
competence of professional teachers, we
need to be engaged in a collective enterprise
of fostering student learning, would this
commit us as faculty to speaking out against
practices in our institutions that are not
conducive to student learning? At the risk of
seeming completely idealistic and out of touch
with how colleges and universities actually
work, I'd like to re-examine two nearly
universal practices in higher education that
seem to violate the principle of being student
learning-centered that is at the heart of
feminist pedagogy and of the ethics of
teaching I have proposed. These two
practices are the large lecture classes
common in freshman general education and
gateway to the major courses, and evaluation
through grading. Large lecture classes are
justified on the basis of cost. They are
economical because a single senior faculty
member can deliver instruction to hundreds of
students, assisted by low wage part-time
instructors and graduate student teaching
assistants. But is delivery of instruction the
same thing as learning? It is nearly impossible
in courses of this size, even with the addition
of study groups, to make students and their
learning needs the focus of the design of
curriculum and learning experiences, or to
create learning communities that welcome
and value each student's contribution. W hile
universities and colleges express concern
over freshman retention rates, don't these
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courses really serve to weed out those who
are insufficiently prepared or committed to
higher education? 
In a similar fashion, the system of
grading that is ostensibly about recognizing
and evaluating student learning primarily
serves a social sorting purpose. Yes, it may
provide a quick, if not always reliable, means
of predicting the quality of a student's later
performance in jobs and professional studies.
But as Alfie Kohn argued in "The Dangerous
Myth of Grade Inflation," widespread concerns
about grade inflation in higher education mask
the true problems with grading. Kohn argues
that, by pitting students against one another in
the pursuit of a scarce commodity, the "A,"
grading all too often directs students' attention
not to learning, but to winning. "The number of
peers that a student has bested tells us little
about how much she knows and is able to do.
Indeed, such grading policies may create a
competitive climate that is counterproductive
for winners and losers alike" (Kohn 2002).
There are processes other than grading for
evaluating student performance which
recognize the unique character of each
student's learning, such as giving narrative
feedback in relation to learning outcomes, and
creating portfolios of student work. At Alverno,
we do not give grades, but do give narrative
feedback, and every student maintains an
electronic portfolio of her work. W e know from
our practice that these can be very rich
sources of data for predicting our graduates'
subsequent performance, and they do find
jobs and enter professional programs at rates
comparable to their graded peers. If both
large lecture courses and grading are
justified, it is not because they contribute to
learning, but because they are assumed to be
the only strategies for delivery of instruction
and evaluation feasible on a large scale.
Perhaps feminist teachers and proponents of
student-centered learning should be working
to find creative and cost-effective alternatives
to both. 
Another Look at an Ethics of Teaching
In this paper I have drawn on feminist
epistemology, ethics and pedagogy to
articulate some aspects of a care-based
ethics of teaching. W hile I have focused
largely on the needs of women students (and
my own practice has been shaped by my
experiences in a liberal arts college for
women) the student-centered approach I have
advocated allows for making the needs of any
students central to teaching and learning.
Understanding teaching as a species of
caring, I have explored some consequences
for teaching practice of the attentiveness,
re s p o n s iv e n e s s ,  a n d  re s p o n s ib i l i t y
characteristic of caring professionals. 
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